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The so called anthropic reasoning1 is at the centre of an intense debate which in recent times has 
sparked not only physicists and cosmologists but also philosophers and theologians. One of the main 
reasons of this wide interest surely resides in the teleological overtones of many recent expositions 
focused on the topic of the fine tuning of some quantities which come out from fundamental physics 
and cosmology. 
The surprising coincidences deriving from dimensionless combinations of fundamental constants of 
physics and cosmological parameters urged many authors to point out at the special character of  many 
features of our universe in innumerable papers and proceedings.2 They have frequently underlined that 
the possibility itself of biological complexity depends critically upon the peculiar values of the coupling 
constants of the four fundamental forces, the slight mass difference between the neutron and the proton, 
and the actual values of those cosmological quantities that, as in case of the Hubble constant H and the 
density parameter , govern cosmic evolution. 
To quote some well known examples, a change of more than 1% of the strong force coupling constant 
would result in the absence of elements heavier than lithium; a little modification of the value of the 
fine structure constant and/or of its gravitational analogue would have result in the lack of those main 
sequence stars which are indispensable for the emergence of complexity and life; a small change in the 
neutron-to-proton mass ratio would again produce disastrous consequences both for the production of 
hydrogen itself and the existence of main sequence stars; a modification of the actual values of the 
above-mentioned parameters H and  (which are connected through Einstein’s field equations of 
general relativity) would result in the production of universes inadequate to produce life at some stage 
of their evolution. 
Similar considerations have revealed the existence of a „delicate balance”3, stimulating three different 
approaches. The silent majority of physicists, waiting for future developments of their discipline, has 
assumed a typical “who cares?” attitude, while a consistent part of scholars (including many eminent 
names of the physics community) found themselves faced with a choice between the following two 
alternatives: 
 
-  1) the „fine tuning” implies the existence of a „fine tuner”4 




 For the meaning of this expression see: Rees, M.J.: Before the beginning. Our universe and others, London 1997. Note that 
Rees does not define explicitly what he means with anthropic reasoning. He simply says that talking of principles is 
„unfortunate”, and declares  then „to prefer the less pretentious phrase ‘anthropic reasoning’”. This last expression was used 
also in the recent Bostrom, N.: Anthropic bias: observation selection effects in science and philosophy, London 2002, to 
summarize a series of topic of anthropic content. 
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 The literature on the topic is immense. The classic texts to become familiar with the arguments involved are: Barrow, J.D.-
Tipler, F.J.: The anthropic cosmological principle, Oxford 1986;  Davies, P.C.W.: The accidental universe, Cambridge 
1982;  Demaret, J  – Barbier, C.: Le principe anthropique en cosmologie, Revue des Questions Scientifiques 152, 1981, p. 
181-222 and 461-509; Demaret, J. – Lambert, D. : Le principe anthopique, l’homme est-il le centre de l’Univers?, Paris 
1994; Gale, G. : The anthropic principle, Scientific American 245, December 1981, p. 154-161;  Leslie, J. : Universes, 
London 1989. For extensive bibliographies see Balashov, Y.: Resource Letter AP-1: The anthropic principle, American 
Journal of Physics 59, 1991, p. 1069-1076 and Bettini, S.: Il labirinto antropico, available on 
www.swif.uniba.it/lei/saggi/antropico . It will be re-located to: http://www.swif.it/biblioteca/cxc/ .  
3
 Davies, P.C.W.: The accidental…, chapter 3. 
4
 The expression  „divine fine tuner” is used frequently in John Leslie’s papers. 
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- 2) the surprise raised by the „fine tuning” disappears if we consider our universe as a very particular 
member of a large ensemble of “universes” characterized by all possible combinations of initial 
conditions and fundamental constants. 
 
This dichotomy between a divine Designer and a “many worlds” conception has indeed been at the 
centre of innumerable discussions and speculations. Moreover, it has also been the main motive of that 
debate on the anthropic principle which, in the last twenty years or so, has passed from the pages of the 
physical and astronomical journals to those of popular books and public conferences. 
The point is here that the emergence of teleological aspects in the abovementioned discussion came out 
as a by-product of a technical debate which originally involved a significant group of cosmologists and 
gravitational researchers and which initially evolved without any kind of teleological overtones (apart 
few notable exceptions as that due to John Archibald Wheeler5). 
On the contrary the concept of many different worlds, at least as a counterpart of the idea that our 
observed region could be not representative of the whole Cosmos, was part and parcel of the anthropic 
debate since the very beginning. 
This history notwithstanding, many people believe that the strict association between anthropic 
reasoning and teleology was always there. As a matter of fact this belief is largely due to the public 
debate that followed the publication of Barrow and Tipler’s essay The Anthropic Cosmological 
Principle in 1986. Those two authors were surely not the first to perceive or discuss the teleological 
implications of anthropic principle(s), but their book was surely very influential in promoting a 
“resurgence of teleological views” if not within the context of contemporary physics, surely in large 
part of the studies concerning the philosophical meaning of physical researches. 
In the following pages I will try to outline a history of anthropic reasoning and principles, limiting 
myself to the ambit of cosmology, where the arguments emerged. One of my aims will be to show that 
teleological elements entered the debated topics only at a relatively late , while reflections on many 
worlds represented a complement of anthropic ideas since the very beginning.6 
 
2. COSMIC SPECULATIONS AND ANTHROPIC HINTS IN PRE-RELATIVISTIC PHYSICS 
 
To single out an origin for the application of anthropic reasoning in cosmology is probably a matter of 
taste. At any rate, an important preliminary notion for any properly cosmological talk consists in a well-
defined concept of the universe as a whole. 
A non-contradictory quantitative concept of the universe as a self-contained entity was not available 
until the emergence of general relativistic cosmology in 1917. Before that date, the universe was indeed 
a very vague and undefined concept. As everyone knows, a Newtonian cosmology was in effect beset 
with unsolvable paradoxes due to the appearance of divergent integrals in all problems containing an 
infinite and uniformly distributed quantity of matter in an infinite Euclidean space. 
The term universe itself was not used with great pleasure among scientists if not as a generic name 
applied exclusively to that architecture of the heavens that emerged from observations.”7 
                                                
5
 Wheeler is a very important, but also a rather sui generis, figure in the ambit of contemporary’s physics community. For a 
surely romanced report on his personality see: Overbye, D.: Lo splendente meccanismo dell’universo, Scienza ’81,  1981, p. 
64-70 (and also: Overbye, D.: God's Turnstile: The Work of John Wheeler and Stephen Hawking, Mercury 20, n. 4, 
July/August 1991, p. 98-108.) The use of anthropic reasoning was surely not  the first  example of a close proximity of 
Wheeler with teleology. Just to quote an example, think at the implication of the formulation of electrodynamics developed 
by him and his pupil Richard Feynman in Wheeler, J.A.-Feynman, R.P.: Interaction with the absorber as the mechanism of 
radiation, Reviews of Modern Physics 17, 1945, p. 157-181. 
6
 Of course, I am not saying that teleological interpretations of physical results or principles are something new. This will be 
simply wrong (as showed, for instance, by interminable debates on the meaning of action principles). I am simply saying that 
the teleological interpretation of the anthropic principle became commonplace mainly after Barrow and Tipler’s book. 
7
 As significant anecdotes let me say that Clifford affirmed that „in regard to the universe” there was „no right to draw any 
conclusion at all" (Clifford W.K.: The first and the last catastrophe. A criticism on some recent speculations about the 
duration of the universe, 1874; reprinted in Lectures and essays, volume 1, London 1901, p. 222-267, quotation on p. 264), 
while -three decades later- Rutherford prohibited his students to use that expression during his lessons. 
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A notable exception was the debate on the global applications of the principles of thermodynamics. 
Undoubtedly, although not in a rigorous mathematical sense, the term universe appeared often in that 
context in connection with the well-known prediction of a state of thermodynamical equilibrium and 
mechanical Heath Death. 
The second Hauptsatz posed, amongst other urgent conceptual questions, a major conundrum about the 
present state of the world; i.e.: why the observed universe appeared so remote from the state of 
equilibrium? 
It is difficult to establish who stated the problem first, but it soon became a major open question. With 
an eternity of time available it seemed absurd that the Heath Death wasn't reached yet, at least if you 
are not ready to accept a blatant violation of the first principle as that of a special beginning of the 
universe as a whole or, at least, of the cosmical surroundings of that particular region of the universe 
which is inhabited by us. 
Just to quote a couple of examples, Vogt discussed the topic around 18788, while Fitzgerald, in 1894, 
asked9: 
 
why the ether, the solar system, and the whole universe were not subject to the Boltzmann-Maxwell law? 
 
Amongst the many attempts to furnish answers to  questions of this kind, we can distinguish a class of 
answers of anthropic flavour. The first author to suggest something of this kind was presumably 
Samuel Tolver Preston. This English physicist dedicated large part of his time to thermodynamics, 
invoking an application of10 
 
the principles of kinetic theory to the case of the universe not so much as a speculation, but rather as a necessary 
deduction following from the known principle that detached mass moving freely in space (as the stellar masses 
are observed to do) and at such distances apart that gravity between the several masses is incompetent to deflect 
the path of the masses appreciably, must move in straight lines, and have their motions regulated under the 
mutual encounters in accordance with the principles of the kinetic theory. 
 
In 1879 he suggested that the scale of the universe was „too big” for human observers11 and that our 
conclusions were then vitiated by an „extremely limited view”.12 Preston argued that the region of the 
universe that we inhabit13 could be atypical because of its „rather exceptional” concentration of hot 
luminous stars and suggested that14: 
 
We may happen to be in a part [of the universe] where the mean temperature of the component matter is 
exceptionally high, as, of course, from the fact of our being in existence, we must be in a part which is suited to 
the conditions of life. 
 
Although this passage clearly recalls many contemporary anthropic statements, it does not follow that 
Preston’s position was particularly in the vanguard. His treatment was in fact just one among many, in 
                                                
8
 Vogt, J.G.: Die Kraft. Eine real-monistische Weltanschauung, Leipzig 1878, in particular p. 90. 
9
 Fitzgerald as reported in Bryan, G.H: The kinetic theory of gases, Nature 51, p. 152, 1894. Cf. also: Fitzgerald, G.F.: The 
kinetic theory of gases, Nature 51, 1895, p. 221-222. 
10
 Preston, S. T.: On the possibility of explaining the continuance of life in the universe consistent with the tendency to 
temperature-equilibrium, Nature 19, 1879, p. 460-462, on p. 462. 
11
 Preston imagined human observers in a position analogous to that of a Maxwell's demon intent on reaching conclusions 
about the equilibrium temperature of a gas from the point of view of a single molecule. See: Preston, S. T.: On the possibility 
of accounting for the continuance of recurring changes in the universe, consistently with the tendency to temperature-
equilibrium, Philosophical Magazine (5) 8, 1879, p. 152-163, in particular p. 161. Cf. also Preston, S. T.: Temperature 
equilibrium in the universe in relation to the kinetic theory, Nature 20, 1879, p. 28. 
12Preston, S. T.: On the possibility of explaining …, note 2, p. 462 
13
 Preston pointed out that such a region (as other similar ones) must be „amply extensive enough to allow an amount of 
activity and variability of energy adapted to the conditions of life”. He suggested moreover that a region „very extensive, 
absolutely speaking”, results  „infinitesimal, relatively speaking (i.e., in comparison with the boundless universe)”. Cf.: On 
the possibility of explaining…, p. 462. 
14
 Preston, S. T.: On the possibility of explaining…, p. 462. 
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the large debate on the cosmological application of the kinetic theory and on the consequences of 
energy dissipation. The scenario of the universe depicted by Preston, moreover, was typical of the day 
and involved, for instance, the presence of a large number of dark stars to explain the energetic source 
of the luminous stars. At last, as for many other authors, the main target of Preston was that of showing 
how the „stability and permanence” of the „collective universe” could have been assured forever 
through a „recurring change”.15 
In any case, his anthropic solution to the problem of the present state of the observed universe, and the 
scenario of a large but still local fluctuation in a „boundless universe” globally in the uniform state of 
maximum entropy, were both original. The author proposed them on several occasions presupposing 
that the existence of regions, where „the conditions necessary for life” are maintained for periods of 
time long in comparison to human experience, represented a consistent scenario.16 Nonetheless Preston 
was accused of „confusion of reasoning and of unsoundness”17, forcing him to reply that his arguments 
implied no violation of the „existing physical principles” in the past and a satisfying „explanation for 
the existing state of things”.18 
A new version of Preston’s scenario was indeed re-proposed less than two decades later by Ludwig 
Boltzmann. When this happened, the debate on the second Hauptsatz and the kinetic theory had already 
been significantly advanced. During the 1880s, in fact, theoretical physicists had to confront themselves 
with many experimental inconsistencies and with innumerable difficulties.19 
In the general debate on these topics particular relevance was reserved to the discussion of Boltzmann’s 
minimum theorem. This important mathematical tool represents a relevant piece of the history of the 
thermodynamics of irreversible processes and has been studied in a historical perspective on various 
occasions.20 Here, I’ll limit myself to remember that Boltzmann’s minimum theorem, or H-theorem as it 
was generally known after 189021, stated that a particular function describing the behaviour of the 
inverse of the entropy of a macroscopic isolated system (the H-function), must remain, for the greater 
part of time, at that minimum value which represents the state of maximum entropy. 
The status of the theorem remained unclear and raised two kind of controversies: the first, directed 
basically at the formal aspects of the theorem involved mainly authors of English language and took 
place essentially after Boltzmann’s participation at the British Association meeting held in Oxford in 
August 1894; the second, more radical controversy concerned mainly German authors and was directed 
against the whole statistical interpretation of the second Hauptsatz and the probabilistic nature of the H-
theorem. 
The British controversy consisted in an exchange of letters and short contributions which appeared on 
the pages of Nature in the years 1894/1895. It was in this context that Fitzgerald question about the 
present state of the universe, originally raised at the Oxford meeting, was re-proposed by both Bryan 
and Culverwell.22 
                                                
15
 Preston, S. T.: On the Possibility of accounting…, p. 162. 
16
 Cf. Preston, S. T.: A question regarding one of the physical premises upon which the finality of universal change is based, 
Philosophical Magazine (5) 10, 1880, p. 338-342, on p.341. 
17
 Muir, W.: Mr. Preston on general temperature-equilibrium, Nature 20,1879, p. 6. 
18
 Preston's answer to Muir, Nature 20,1879, p. 6. 
19
 For instance, still in 1901 Kelvin declared Maxwell’s equipartition theorem as one of the clouds that were obscuring the 
clarity of the dynamical theory. See: Thomson, W.: Nineteenth century clouds over the dynamical theory of heat and light, 
Philosophical Magazine (6) 2, 1901, p. 1-40. 
20
 E.g.: Ehrenfest, P. & T.: Begriffliche Grundlagen der statistischen Auffassung der Mechanick, in: Enzyklopädie der 
matematischen Wissenschaften, Klein F.-Müller C. (eds), vol. 4, part 4, p. 1-90, Leipzig 1912; Reichenbach, H.: The 
direction of time, Berkeley 1956; Daub, E.E.: Probability and thermodynamics. The reduction of the second law, Isis 60, 
1969, p. 318-330; Brush, S.G.: The kind of motion we call heat. A history of the kinetic theory of gases in the 19th century, 
Amsterdam 1976; Eggarter, T.P.: A comment on Boltzmann's H-theorem and time reversal, American Journal of Physics 41, 
1973, p. 874-877; Kuhn, T.: Black-body theory and the quantum discontinuity 1894 - 1912, Oxford 1978; Dias, P.M.C.: 
"Will someone say exactly what the H-theorem proves?" A study of Burbury's condition A and Maxwell's proposition II, 
Archive for History of Exact Sciences 46, 1994, p. 341-366. 
21After: Burbury, S.H.: On some problems in the kinetic theory of gases, Philosophical Magazine (5) 30, 1890, p. 298-317. 
22
 Bryan, G.H: The kinetic theory …; Culverwell, E.P.: The kinetic theory of gases, Nature 51, 1894, p. 78-79. 
 5 
In the February 28th, 1895 issue of Nature Boltzmann clarified his position and argued that the H-
theorem demanded simply „that in the course of time the universe must tend to a state where the 
average vis viva of every atom is the same”, but evidently found that this was not enough to evade 
Fitzgerald’s objection. Surely he was worried by a conception which presumed a very special 
arrangement of the whole universe at a certain time (if not a very peculiar beginning), finding hard to 
reconcile it with the mechanical Weltbild. 
As a way out he took refuge to an idea attributed to his „old assistant” Ignaz Schütz23, that was 
expressed in the following terms24: 
 
We assume that the whole universe is, and rests forever, in thermal equilibrium. The probability that one (only 
one) part of the universe is in a certain state, is the smaller the farther this state is from thermal equilibrium; but 
this probability is greater, the greater the universe itself is. If we assume the universe great enough we can make 
the probability of one relatively small part being in a given state (however far from the state of thermal 
equilibrium), as great as we please. We can also make the probability great that, though the whole universe is so 
far from thermal equilibrium, our world is in its present state. It may be said that the world is so far from thermal 
equilibrium that we cannot imagine the improbability of such a state. but can we imagine, on the other side, how 
small a part of the whole universe this world is? Assuming the universe great enough, the probability that such a 
small part of it as our world should be in its present state, is no longer small. 
If this assumption were correct, our world would return more and more to thermal equilibrium; but because the 
whole universe is so great, it might be probable that at some future time some other world might deviate as far 
from thermal equilibrium as our world does at present. Then the aforementioned H-curve would form a 
representation of what takes place in the universe. The summits of the curve would represent the worlds where 
visible motion and life exist. 
 
This argument was repeated by Boltzmann at least two times in the following years.25 On these new 
occasions the author no longer credited Schütz, and presented the idea of fluctuations of cosmical 
proportions as his personal opinion. This presumably was a consequence of the polemical exchange 
with Ernst Zermelo which had started in December 1895. 
It is well known that, contrary to the English authors that participated in the Nature debate, Zermelo 
didn’t try simply to eliminate the contradictions between the mechanistic foundations of the H-theorem 
and the irreversibility of entropy. He rather affirmed the absolute value of the second Hauptsatz, 
rejecting any mechanistic interpretation. 
The specific points of the Zermelo/Boltzmann controversy have been told many times26, but what is 
relevant here is the answer of Boltzmann to certain „questions of principle” [principielle Fragen] 
advanced by his rival.27 
                                                
23
 According to Blackmore “Boltzmann was rather critical of Dr. Schütz's abilities”. See: Blackmore, J. (ed.): Ludwig 
Boltzmann. His later life and philosophy, Dordrecht, 1995, p. 48. 
24
 Boltzmann, L.: On certain questions of the theory of gases, Nature 51, 1895, p. 413-415. The anthropic nature of 
Boltzmann’s argument was underlined for instance in Davies, P.C.W.: The accidental …; recently it has been discussed 
critically in Cirkovic, M.M.: Anthropic fluctuations vs. weak anthropic principle, physics abstracts: physics/0109072. 
According to Cirkovic, Boltzmann simply stated that the existence of intelligent observers implies some restrictions on 
possible worlds but, nonetheless, he contradicted contemporary formulation of the weak anthropic principle.  The point is 
here that Boltzmann’s hypothesis doesn’t accept  that  the uniformity of laws is preserved in entire spacetime except at 
initial (and possibly final) singularity”. 
Although it invokes concepts unknown in Boltzmann’s times, this is indeed a cogent critic. Anyway, as Cirkovic himself 
suggests, we have to regard also the variation on the Boltzmann-Schuetz theme” that can be played within the multiverse 
framework, in which our existence as observers selects a particular domain”. The strict alliance between early anthropic 
proposals and many universes is indeed one of the main points touched in the present paper. 
25
 Boltzmann, L.: Zu Hrn. Zermelo's Abhandlung über die mechanische Erklärung irreversibler Vorgänge, Annalen der 
Physik 60, p. 392/398; Vorlesungen über Gastheorie, Band 2, Leipzig, 1898. 
26
 The controversy took place in:  Zermelo, E.: Ueber einen Satz der Dynamik und die mechanische Wärmtheorie, Annalen 
der Physik 57, 1896 p. 485-494; Ueber mechanische Erklärungen irreversibler Vorgänge, Annalen der Physik 59, 1896, p. 
793-801; Boltzmann, L.: Entgegnung auf die wärmetheoretischen Betrachtungen des Hrn. E. Zermelo, Annalen der Physik 
57, 1896, p. 773-784; Zu Hrn. Zermelo's… . Among the secondary sources, one can see: Brush, S.G.: The kind of motion…; 
Klein, M.J.: Paul Ehrenfest: The making of a theoretical physicist, Amsterdam 1970; Steckline, V.S.: Zermelo, Boltzmann, 
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During the debate, it was made evident that a  non-contradictory statistical explanation required the 
adoption of an „unverifiable assumption” [unbeweisbare Annahme] according to which the universe, or 
at least a very large part of it, is at present in an „improbable state" because it „began from a very 
improbable state".28 Boltzmann found this conclusion, as everyone based on „special conceptions on the 
universe” [specielle Vorstellungen über das Universum], very unpleasant.29 According to him, in fact, 
there was another conception which was consistent with the mechanical representation of the world, 
i.e.: that, suggested in the 1895 paper, of a universe globally in thermal equilibrium containing here and 
there „relatively small ambits” [verhältnissmässig kleine Bezirke] (called single worlds [Einzelwelten] 
and imagined of „the extension of our stellar space” [der Ausdehnung unseres Sternenraums]) which 
can be far from that state.30 
Such a scenario, apart from evading the unsatisfactory picture of an unilateral change of the whole 
universe from a determined initial state to a final terminal state”, was considered by Boltzmann as the 
best image available of the “world as a mechanical system”.31 
 
3.ANTHROPIC SUGGESTIONS IN THE ERA OF THE EXPANDING UNIVERSE 
 
The fundamental characteristics of a (general relativistic) mathematical model of the whole universe 
became clear thanks to Einstein’s theory of gravitation and to the association between the revolutionary 
idea of an expanding universe and Hubble’s empirical law. General relativistic cosmology became 
indeed centred on a particular class of space-times of constant curvature: those which are spatially 
homogeneous and globally isotropic or, in other words, obey the cosmological principle. 
As a result, after the general acceptance of the idea of an expansion of space in 1930, many reviews 
were published to point out the dynamical behaviour of the many possible homogeneous and isotropic 
universes (the Fridman-Lemaitre-Robertson-Walker or FLRW universes) which are regulated by that 
simplified version of Einstein’s equations known as Fridman’s equations.32 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and the recurrence paradox, American Journal of Physics 51, 1983, p. 894-897; Bettini, S.: Immagini dell’universo-le due 
genesi della cosmologia, Ph. D. thesis, Firenze 2001. 
27
 Zermelo, E.: Ueber mechanische Erklärungen…, p. 801. 
28
 Boltzmann, L.: Zu Hrn. Zermelo's …, p. 392. 
29
 Ibid., p. 396. 
30
 Boltzmann, L.: Vorlesungen über Gastheorie, Band 2, p. 257. 
31
 Boltzmann, L.: Vorlesungen über Gastheorie, Band 2, p. 257; cf. Zu Hrn. Zermelo's …, p. 396. The word image is 
intended here the sense of Weltbild. 
32
 E.g.: De Sitter, W.: On the expanding universe, Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam. Section of 
Sciences, Proceedings 35, 1932, p. 596-607; The astronomical aspects of the theory of relativity, University of California 
Publication in Mathematics 2, n. 8, Berkeley 1933, p. 143-196; Juvet, G.: Sur quelques solutions des équations 
cosmologiques de la relativité, Commentarii Mathematici Helvetici 3, 1931, p. 154-172; Heckmann, O.H.L.: Die 
Ausdehnung der Welt in ihrer Abhängigkeit von der Zeit, Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu 
Göttingen, 1932, p. 97-106; Kunii, S.: Solutions of cosmological field equations and models of the universe with 
annihilation of matter, Memoirs of the College of science, Kyoto Imperial University 15, 1932, p. 97-111; Kohler, M.: 
Beiträge zum kosmologischen Problem und zur Lichtausbreitung in Schwerefeldern, Annalen der Physik 16, 1933, p. 129-
161; Robertson, H.P.: Relativistic cosmology, Reviews of Modern Physics 5, 1933, p. 62-90; Zaycoff, R.: Zur relativischen 
Kosmogonie, Zeitschrift für Astrophysik 6, 1933, p. 128-137; Mineur, H.: L'Univers in expansion, Paris 1933; Bronstein, 
M.P.: K voprusu o vozmozhnoi teorii mira kak tselogo, Uspekhi Astronomichskii Nauk 3, 1933, p. 3-30; Tolman, R.C.: 
Relativity, thermodynamics, and cosmology, Oxford 1934. In the early 1930ies a limited number of authors began also to 
study various state equations for the fluid which fills the whole of space. Apart from the above-cited papers of de Sitter and 
Robertson , see in particular: Silberstein, L.: Illuminated spacetime: optical effects of isotropic radiation spread over elliptic 
space, Philosophical Magazine (7) 9, 1930, p. 50-57; Tolman, R.C.: On the possible line elements for the universe, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 15, 1929, p. 297-304; On the use of the 
energy-momentum principle in general relativity, Physical Review 35, 1930, p. 875-895; More complete discussion of the 
time-dipendence of the non-static element for the universe, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 16, 1930, p. 409-420; Nonstatic model of the universe with reversible annihilation of matter, Physical 
Review 38, p. 797-814; On the theoretical requirements for a periodic behaviour of the universe, Physical Review 38, 1931, 
p. 1758-1771; Synge, E.H.: Limitations on the behaviour of an expanding universe, Transactions of the Royal Society of 
Canada (3) 30, 1936, p. 165-178. 
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The (Preston)/Schütz/Boltzmann argument raised various critical reflections before 193033 and was then 
sometime discussed in the new context of the expanding universe. Some authors considered it 
„completely false”34 because of the implausibility of a fluctuation as large as the region of space visible 
to Mount Wilson reflector35; others simply found it incomprehensible.36 Someone as influential as the 
British biologist John Burdon Sanderson Haldane, attributed a certain relevance to Boltzmann’s 
hypothesis arguing that „in the course of eternity any event with finite probability will occur”.37 
Tolman recalled Boltzmann’s argument on 1931 in one of his enquiries on the meaning of the entropy 
of the universe in the context of a relativistic thermodynamics.38 There he remembered the old difficulty 
of classical thermodynamics expressed by Fitzgerald's question, confiding to have learnt Boltzmann’s 
answer through Tatiana Ehrenfest.39 Aiming at the foundation of a cogent relativistic thermodynamics, 
Tolman found all possible classical way outs, including Boltzmann’s, wrong or incomplete answers to 
the above-mentioned question. Anyway, he depicted the „fluctuations theory” as an „important 
possibility” and an „important part” of any future „relatively complete treatment of the entropy of the 
universe”.40 
Coming from one of the most empirically oriented cosmologists41, this appreciation of the fluctuation 
hypothesis cannot be a coincidence. Boltzmann’s scenario, transformed by Tolman into that of an 
inhomogeneous universe with no temporal beginning, represented indeed an alternative to those simple 
models that, as FLRW universes, were extrapolating an a priori assumption of spatial homogeneity 
beyond the observable region. 
Tolman considered FLRW universes as extraordinarily important geometrical tools in virtue of their 
mathematical simplicity, but he was always clear that they were only rough idealizations not to be 
confounded with the actual physical universe. In 1934 he even proposed to study the „effects of 
inhomogeneity on the theoretical behaviour of cosmological models”, underlying the necessity of being 
not „too dogmatic” about accepting conclusions deducted from FLRW models.42 
                                                
33
 E.g.: Nabl, J.: Der zweite Hauptsatz der Thermodynamik und der Satz von der Entropie im Lichte des Boltzmannschen H-
Theorems der Gastheorie, Naturwissenschaftliche Rundschau 21, 1906, p. 337-341; Borel, E.: L'espace et le temps, Paris 
1923; Weyl, H.: Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft, München 1927. 
34
 Bronstein M.P.-Landau L: Über den zweiten Wärmesatz und die Zusammenhangsverhältnisse der Welt in Großen, 
Physikalische Zeitschrift der Sowjetunion 4, 1933, p. 114-118, on p. 117. 
35
 Cf. Bronstein M.P.: On the expanding universe, Physikalische Zeitschrift der Sowjetunion 3, 1933, p. 73-82, in particular 
p. 74. 
36
 E.g.: Takeuchi, T.: On the cyclic universe, Proceedings of the Physico-Mathematical Society of Japan (3) 13, 1931, p. 
166-177, in particular p. 166. 
37
 Haldane J.B.S.: The universe and irreversibility, Nature 122, 1928, p. 808-809, on p. 809. I consider here anyway the post-
1930 Haldane’s book called The inequality of man and other essays, London 1932. The author calculated that an improbable 
distribution as that requested by Boltzmann’s thesis was so improbable to demand something as 1010
100
 years to happen. 
Notwithstanding he concluded that -in a truly cosmological perspective- the hypothesis of fluctuations represented the most 
reliable explanation of the apparent contradiction between the observed state of the universe and the predictions of 
thermodynamics. 
38
 For a general review of Tolman’s ideas see: Tolman R.C.: Thermodynamics and relativity, Bulletin of the American 
Mathematical Society. 39, 1933, p. 49-74. 
39
 Tolman, R.C.: On the entropy of the universe as a whole, Physical Review 37, p. 1639-1660, 1931, on p. 1642. Note that 
T. Eherenfest came back on Boltzmann’s argument in the preface of the English edition of Ehrenfest, P. & T.: Begriffliche… 
(cf.  n. 16 above). See: The Conceptual Foundations of the Statistical Approach in Mechanics, Ithaca (NY) 1959, p. xi. 
40
 Tolman, R.C.: On the entropy…, p. 1660. 
41
 On the topic see: Merleau-Ponty, J.: Cosmologie du XX siècle, Paris 1965; Eisenstaedt J.: Cosmology: a space for thought 
on general relativity, in: Foundation of big bang cosmology. Proceedings of the seminar on the foundations of big bang 
cosmology, Meyerstein W.F. (ed.), Singapore, 1989, p. 271-295. 
42
 Tolman, R.C.: Effects of inhomogeneity on cosmological models, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 20, 1934, p. 169-176, on p. 176. Tolman suggested also the possibility of a universe of variable 
curvature with open and closed regions, pointing out at a scenario that was developed both in Soviet cosmological 
speculations and in various many universes proposals of the 1960ies. 
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Such an attitude echoed, probably without Tolman’s knowledge, that already suggested - not without a 
certain polemical vein towards Einstein’s static cosmology - by Emile Borel in the 1920ies.43 This 
French author transformed Boltzmann’s argument in a warning according to which „local knowledge 
cannot give knowledge of the universe”.44 He then compared our conditions as Earth-based-observers to 
that of a fictitious inhabitant of a drop of water who remains unable to see the complexity beyond 
his/her abode.45 
Anyway, apart from the reservations against the cosmological principle in its deductive formulation and 
the exploration of a model-universe inhomogeneous on a very large scale46, Tolman underlined also the 
anthropic content of Boltzmann’s hypothesis. He suggested in fact implicitly that the existence of 
„sentient beings” represented by itself a valid argument against the  „enormous improbability” of the 
requested fluctuation.47 
These topics (criticism of cosmological deductivism, proposal of an inhomogeneous scenario and 
anthropic justification of the special characteristics of our observable region) were all revived in the 
mid 1950ies in a paper which appeared on the Newsletter of the astrophysical Institute of Kazakhstan 
and that was later considered by Ya.B. Zel'dovich as the first application of the anthropic principle in 
relativistic cosmology.48 
The paper in question49, called Essential features of the astrophysical observed universe as typical 
properties of the inhabited cosmic system, was written in Russian by Grigory Moiseevich Idlis and was 
published in 1958 although the author remembers to have developed his ideas two years before.50 
Of course, we must consider Idlis’ paper at the light of both the status of the worldwide cosmological 
controversy that characterized the 1950ies and of the peculiar situation of the whole discipline of 
relativistic cosmology in the USSR a few years after the death of Stalin. As practically any paper 
published there, Idlis’s article revealed a mutual contamination between the concepts of dialectical 
materialism and those emerging from observational and theoretical cosmology.51 Moreover, it shared 
with all the other Soviet papers devoted in some way to cosmology, the picture of a universe that was 
infinite52, eternal and inhomogeneous on a very large scale.53 
                                                
43
 Borel, E.: L'espace et le temps …; Cf. also Borel’s preface to the 1920 French edition of Einstein’s Über die spezielle und 
the allgemeine Relativitätstheorie (Gemeinverständlich) which is available in: Œuvres de Emile Borel; tome III, Paris, 1972, 
p. 1839-1853. 
44
 Borel, E.: L'espace et le temps …p. 114 of the English translation published in 1960 by Dover, New York. 
45
 Once transplanted in the context of general relativistic cosmology this basic conception was more or less explicitly 
emphasized by empirically oriented researchers such as Tolman and Dingle. It received then a rigorous treatment in George 
Ellis' papers on the unverifiability of cosmological principles. See in particular Ellis, G.F.R.: Cosmology and verifiability, 
Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society 16, 1975, p. 245-264. 
46
 See also  Tolman, R.C.: The age of the universe, Reviews of Modern Physics 21, 1949, p. 374-378. 
47
 Tolman, R.C.: On the entropy…, p. 1642. 
48
 Zeldovich, Ya. B.: The birth of a closed universe, and the anthropogenic principle, Soviet Astronomy Letters 7 (5), p. 322-
323. Note that anthropogenic is here simply a bad translation for anthropic. 
49
 Idlis, G.M.:  	
  
	   

   
	 ; Izvestia Astrofiziceskogo Institute of Kazakhinstan, SSR 7, 1958, p. 39-54. After this paper, Idlis 
forgot the anthropic principle until , during the 1980ies, it resurged in the context of a wider speculation on the unity of the 
sciences of nature. See e.g. G. M. Idlis:   	
,   
 Revolutions in astronomy, 
astrophysics and cosmology (Moscow, 1985); G. M. Idlis in: Abstracts of the 8th International Congress of Logic, 
Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Moscow, V. L. Rabinovich (ed.), vol. 5, part 2, p. 122. For an exhaustive list of 
Russian publications of the author see: www.ihst.ru/personal/idlis/Idlis_rus.htm  . 
50Personal communication to the author by Idlis, interviewed in Florence on June 7th, 2001. Idlis added that, in the 1950ies, 
he was unaware of Whitrow and Dicke suggestions. 
51
 On the topic see Graham, L.R.: Science, philosophy and human behavior in the Soviet Union, New York 1987; and the 
much less sympathetic: Mikulak M.W.: Soviet philosophic-cosmological thought, Philosophy of Science 25, 1958, p. 35-50: 
Cf. also Merleau-Ponty, J.: Cosmologie …, ch. IX; Bronshten R.A.-McCutcheon R.A.: V. T. Ter-Oganezov, ideologist of 
Soviet astronomy, Journal for the History of Astronomy 26, 1995, p. 325-348. 
52
 Infinite and then open, as requested in Fock’s version of Einstein’s gravitational theory. Although suggesting 
inhomogeneity, Idlis stated in fact that the metagalactic space is one of negative curvature. 
53
 This last characteristic (inhomogeneity) reflects the concept of a  structural infinity which is absent in the simplified 
hypothesis adopted in the Western cosmological models. The concept is linked to the dialectical materialism’s conception 
according to which matter is inhexhaustible and exposed to a qualitative development. It is also linked to the hierarchic 
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Idlis anyway accepted the general relativistic interpretation of the red-shifts, limiting himself to raise 
objections against the linearity of the velocity-distance relation. As usual he referred to the observed 
expanding part of the universe as the metagalaxy54, suggesting to consider it a very peculiar region of 
the infinite universe; i.e.: a particular system of galaxies, extended over at least five billion light years 
and approaching in first approximation an isotropic and homogeneous cosmological model with 
characteristic age, average density, average temperature and expansion rate. 
The heart of Idlis’ monography consisted in connecting the „characteristic features” of the observed 
region of the universe to the properties necessary for the rise, evolution and maintenance of life.55 
Idlis considered, firstly, the conditions necessary for the emergence of life on a local astronomical scale 
(a typical work in what today we would call astrobiology, in the spirit of many classic papers of Idlis' 
mentor: Vasilii Grigor'evich Fesenkov56). In the second part of his paper the Soviet astronomer then 
discussed the properties necessary for the emergence of life in the large structure of the universe, 
pointing out the peculiarity of an approach which was looking for a „coherent solution” of the 
properties of the observed region from the „fact itself of our existence”.57 
At last, he concluded that any typical inhabited system would have shared with our observable 
expanding metagalaxy the fact of necessarily being an „isolated" region of the universe endowed with 
an appropriate age, density, temperature and chemical composition. 
Following Boltzmann, he stated moreover that there was no reason for appealing to „anomalous initial 
conditions” of the whole universe. In fact, maintaining that living beings can observe only regions of 
the universe that do possess the properties of a typical habitated system and not a region whatever in the 
„infinite multiformity” of the universe, we have no right to extrapolate the properties of our observable 
region to the whole.58 
In his rehabilitation of Boltzmann’s hypothesis, Idlis rejected the objections expressed in name of the 
improbability of a fluctuation of cosmical proportion by Soviet authors as Bronstein, Landau and 
Zel’manov.59 He remarked that the existence of a  „thinking being” does not simply demand the 
„appearance of an habitable solar system”, but rather implies as a rule the generation of a very large 
quantity of uninhabitable planetary systems, stars and galaxies. Therefore, in conclusion, Idlis 
suggested that the realization of fluctuations „initially devoid of structure” on a metagalactic scale was 
not so unlikely and presumably „necessary for the appearance of the living beings that observe the 
picture of the world extending before us”.60 
                                                                                                                                                                  
universe scenario which was appreciated in the Soviet Union as a way out of Olbers’ paradox in the context of an infinite 
universe. Cf. Idlis, G.M.: 
   

 	  [The theory of relativity and 
the structural infinity of the universe], Astronomicheskii Zhurnal 33, 1956, p. 622-626. 
54
 The term metagalaxy concerns here the expanding system of galaxies in the observable part of the universe. It was adopted 
by Lundmark and Shapley in the 1920ies to avoid any ambiguous expression regarding an unobservable whole. Later it was 
used by different critics of FLRW cosmology (as, for instance, the followers of Klein-Alfven cosmology) and also in the 
papers of astronomers not inclined to cosmological speculations (just to quote an example, Vera Rubin adopted it in her 
celebrated Rubin V.C.: Differential rotation of the inner metagalaxy, Astronomical Journal 56, 1951, p. 47). 
55
 Life was seen here as a „regular exit of matter evolution". Idlis (on p. 55 of his 1958 paper) adopted Oparin’s 
interpretation of the definition of life given in Engels’ Dialectic of nature. In such a perspective life represents a special form 
of the movement of matter or, in other words, an emerging quality that comes out from the movement of matter at a certain 
stage. Cf. Oparin, A.I.- Fesenkov, V.G.: Life in the universe, New York 1961 (Russian original 1956).
56
 Fesenkov and Idlis were very close to each other. In  the late 1930ies Fesenkov suffered as many other astronomers 
persecutions that comported his dismissal from the position of chairman of the Astronomical Council in 1937. In  1941 -
during second world war - Fesenkov was then extradited to Kazakhstan’s capital, Almaty. There he was able to organize a 
new institute of astronomy. Idlis became the new director of the Institute after Fesenkov moved to Moscow. Later, Idlis 
moved to Moscow too, and began to work for the History of Science’s Institute. 
57
 Cf p. 39 of Idlis’ 1958 paper. 
58
 Ibid., p. 52 
59
 Apart from his criticism against Boltzmann’s argument, Abram Leonidovich Zel'manov made some interesting anthropic 
considerations in his writings. He suggested in fact not only a predisposition of the properties of the metagalaxy respect to 
the development of life, but even the existence of „qualitatively different” areas of the metauniverse. He argued moreover 
that other universes (if they exist at all) could be doomed to evolve without witnesses. Contrary to Idlis, Zel’manov did not 
formulate his ideas quantitatively. This was probably due to the fact that, because of his Hebrew origins, he found it very 
hard to publish in astronomical journals (still being able, however, to exert a certain influence on his colleagues). 
60
 All the quotations in the last paragraphs are from p. 53 of Idlis’ 1958 paper. 
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Idlis’ ideas came out almost simultaneously with the papers of Gerald James Whitrow and Robert 
Henry Dicke; two authors very far from Idlis’ materialistic attitude that advanced anthropic answers to 
some old problems, yet sustaining at the same time evolutionary FLRW cosmology. 
Whitrow, in particular, proposed an anthropic resolution of the venerable philosophical question Why 
physical space has three dimensions?61 (arguing that with a space of different dimensionality there 
would be no living being to pose the question) and, similarly to Idlis, alluded around 1955 to an 
anthropic explanation of the size of the observable universe. Anyway he never published these last 
ideas, which were developed years later by Wheeler.62 The only reference to Whitrow’s argument that 
appeared in print during the 1950ies seems to be that due to the philosopher of religion Eric Lionel 
Mascall, who attributed to the English’s mathematician that63 
 
it may be necessary for the universe to have the enormous size and complexity which modern astronomy has 
revealed, in order for the earth to be a possible habitation for living beings. 
 
4.THE EPOCH OF MAN 
 
The decade that began in 1953 saw a renaissance64 of gravitational research. Controversy between the 
general relativistic evolutionary cosmology and the steady-state one was „most intense".65 Among the 
basic events of that period one may count: 
-  Rindler’s paper on horizons66;  
-  Ryle’s results on the distribution of radiosources (which testified the first strong observational 
evidence against steady-state cosmology67);  
- the theory of stellar nucleosynthesis developed by Hoyle, Fowler and the Burbridges, that was 
accompanied by Hoyle’s anthropic prediction of a 12C resonance level around 7,68 MeV68 (a 
                                                
61
 Whitrow, G.J.: Why physical space has three dimensions?, British Journal  for the Philosophy of Science 6, 1955, p. 13-
31 and The structure and evolution of the universe, second edition, New York 1959. For a critical discussion of Whitrow’s 
arguments see for instance: Smart, J.J.C. 1987: Philosophical problems of cosmology, Revue International de Philosophie 
41, p. 112-116; Leslie, J.: Anthropic principle, world ensemble, design, American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982, p. 141-
151. An antecedent to Whitrow’s arguments might be found in: Ehrenfest, P. 1917: In what way does it become manifest in 
the fundamental laws of physics that space has three dimensions?, Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam. 
Section of Sciences, Proceedings 20, 1917, p. 200-209; Welche Rolle spielt die Dreidimensionalität des Raumes in den 
Grundgesetzen der Physik?, Annalen der Physik 61, 1920, p. 440-446. 
62
 E.g.: Wheeler, J.A.: The universe as home for man, American Scientist 62, 1974, p. 683-691; The beam and stay of the 
Taub universe, in: Essays in General Relativity: a Festschrift for Abraham H. Taub, Tipler F.J. (ed.), New York 1980, p. 59-
70.  Wheeler ideas, in turn, were criticised in Shepley, L.C.: Tidal forces in a highly asymmetric Taub universe, in: Essays in 
General Relativity…, p. 71-77. Cf. also Barrow, J.D.–Tipler, F. J.: The Anthropic …, ch. 6.3. 
63
 Mascall, E.L.: Christian theology and natural science, London 1956, p. 43. Someone has noted that the link between the 
size of the universe and the presence of life within it was touched by Edgar Allan Poe in his poem in prose of 1848 Eureka. 
Cf. Cappi, A.: Edgar Allan Poe's physical cosmology, Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society 35, p. 177-192. 
64
 Cf. Pais, A.: 'Subtle is the Lord …'. The science and life of Albert Einstein, Oxford 1982, ch. 15. 
65
 Kragh, H.: Cosmology and controversy. The historical development of two theories of the universe, Princeton 1996, p. 
392. 
66
 Rindler, W.: Visual horizons in world-models, Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 116, 1956, p. 662-677. 
67
 E.g.: Ryle, M.-Scheuer, P.A.G.: The spatial distribution and the nature of radio stars, Proceedings of the Royal Society 
230, 1955, p. 448-462; Ryle, M. - Clarke, R.W.: An examination of the steady-state model in the light of some recent 
observations of radio sources, Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 122, 1961, p. 349-362; Hewish, A.: 
Extrapolation of the number-flux density relation of radio stars by Scheuer’s statistical method, Monthly Notices of the Royal 
Astronomical Society 123, 1961, p. 167-181. 
68
 Hoyle’s prediction of this particular resonance level of carbon-12 has been often regarded as an anthropic one. In the 
course of his enquiries on stellar nucleosynthesis, Hoyle considered the reaction that bring to the formation of 12C from three 
4He nuclei, and deduced that it depends crucially on the existence of an energy level of 12C (the 7,656 one) which is just 
above the rest mass of a 8Be nucleus and a 4He nucleus. He was then amazed by the consequences of this coincidence. In 
fact, if it was not for that particular resonance level, carbon would be extremely rare in the universe. But it was not all: Hoyle 
noted moreover that 16O presented a peculiar resonance level too (the 7,1616 MeV level). If this last energy level was just a 
little higher, almost all the 12C would have been turned in oxygen. 
In the Mid 1960ies (Hoyle, F.: Galaxies, nuclei and quasars, London 1965, ch. VI), Hoyle argued that these coincidences 
could be typical of our part of the universe and suggested that in other portions of the universe, the resonance levels could be 
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result that was indeed presented already in 1953 after a „private communication” of Hoyle 
himself69);  
- a certain debate on Gamow’s theory of creation, followed by all the puzzles and the suspicious 
remarks raised by the conception of a radical violation of physical laws and energy conservation 
in an initial singularity.  
The dispute between the rival theories of cosmology was not the only open front. Of considerable 
interest to cosmologists of any school was the old problem of the coincidences between large 
dimensionless numbers, obtained through the combination of some fundamental quantities of physics 
and cosmology. This problem was crucial already for Weyl70, few years after the formulation of general 
relativity, and became largely known thanks to Eddington and Dirac.71 
Motivated by the peculiar coincidence in order of magnitude between the age of the universe expressed 
in atomic units72, H0-1[(mpc2pi)/h]  (which is at present a pure number of order 1039), and the large pure 
number of order 1039 given by e2/(Gmpme), Dirac advanced in the 1930ies a new basis for cosmology. 
This was based on the „fundamental principle” (which was later renamed the large number hypothesis, 
or LNH for short) according to which all dimensionless numbers of order (1039)n must vary 
proportionally to the n-th power of the age of the universe expressed in atomic units. 
As a particular consequence of this cosmological principle we have that the number given by 
e2/(Gmpme) - or, analogously, what we today call the reciprocal of the dimensionless gravitational fine 
structure constant, αG-1 ≈ (hc)/( 2piGmp2) - should vary with the age of the universe. It follows then that 
at least one of the presumed constants must vary, changing approximately73 as a simple function of the 
age of the universe. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
placed differently, with the result of having no living creatures around. He consequently presented a cosmological scenario 
according to which the universe would be far richer in its possibilities and content than we normally imagine. In other 
regions the numbers would be different and the gross properties of matter, the science of chemistry for example, would be 
entirely changed" (Hoyle, F.: Recent developments in cosmology, Nature 208, 1965, p. 111-114, on p. 114). 
Of course, Hoyle preferred a similar scenario to the eventuality of some sort of finality in nature. Still worried by teleology 
he successively rejected the anthropic principle as a sort of blind alley. Anyway, he confessed at least once to be against the 
support offered by the anthropic principle to the big bang religion, rather than against the strong anthropic principle in itself 
(Hoyle, F.: The Anthropic and perfect cosmological principles/similarities and differences, unpublished manuscript of the 
talk presented at the second Venice conference on cosmology and philosophy on November 1988). For some recent analysis 
of Hoyle’s anthropic argument, see: Livio, M.- Hollowell, D.-Weiss, A.-Truran, J.W.: The anthropic significance of the 
existence of an excited state of 12C, Nature 340, 1989, p. 281-284; Jeltema, T.E.-Sher, M.: The triple-alpha process and the 
anthropically allowed values of the weak scale, Physical Review D61, 2000, p. 017301; Oberhummer, H.-Pichler, R.-Csoto, 
A.: The triple-alpha process and its anthropic significance, nucl-th/9810057 v2, 1999; Oberhummer, H.-Csoto, A.-Schlatt, 
H.: Stellar production rates of carbon and its abundance in the universe, Science 289, 2000, p. 88-94. For Hoyle’s personal 
recollections, see: Hoyle, F.: Home is where the wind blows. Chapters from a cosmologist's life, Oxford 1997, ch..XVIII. 
69Dunbar, R.E.P.-Pixley, R.E.-Wenzel, W.A.-Whaling, W.: The 7.68 MeV state of C12, Physical Review 92, 1953, p. 649-
650 
70
 Weyl, H.: Eine neue Erweiterung der Relativitätstheorie, Annalen der Physik (4) 59, 1919, p. 101-133. On Weyl’s 
contributions see: Bettini, S.: Dalla cabala dei grandi numeri ai principi antropici, degree thesis in philosophy, Firenze 
1990; Gorelik, G.: Hermann Weyl and large numbers in relativistic cosmology, in: Einstein studies in Russia. Einstein 
studies, vol. 10,  Balashov, Y.-Vizgin, V. (eds.), Boston 2002, p. 91-106. 
71
 On the topic cf. among others: Harrison, E.R.: The cosmic numbers, Physics Today 25 (12),1972, p. 30-34;Wessson, P.S: 
Cosmology and geophysics, Bristol 1978; Barrow, J.D.: The lore of large numbers: some historical background to the 
anthropic principle, Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society 22, 1981, p. 388-420; The mysterious lore of large 
numbers, in: Modern cosmology in retrospect, Bergia, S.-Balbinot, R.-Bertotti, B. (eds.), Cambridge 1990, p. 67-93; Kragh, 
H.: Cosmo-physics in the thirties: towards a history of Dirac cosmology, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 13, 
1982, p. 69-108; Cosmonumerology and empiricism: the Dirac-Gamow dialogue, Astronomical Quarterly 8, 1991, p. 109-
126; Bettini, S.: Dalla cabala…; Kilmister, C.W.: Eddington's search for a fundamental theory. A key to the universe, 
Cambridge 1994.  
72
 For instance: (e2/mec3)≈10-23 or h/mpc2 = 0.46 [e2/(mec3)]. In the formulae given here and in the text H0 is the present 
value of the Hubble constant; h/2pi is the Dirac’s form of Planck’s constant (that I’m writing here explicitly); e is the electron 
charge; G is Newton’s gravitational constant; mp and me, are respectively the mass of the proton and of the electron. 
73
 i.e.: apart for small numerical coefficients. 
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Dirac suggested that there was one changing constant and that this was G. This launched a debate 
beyond the narrower domain of theoretical physics which became particularly intense during the 
1950ies.74 
Of particular interest was of course Dicke’s treatment, which emerged from a deep analysis of the 
foundations of general relativity and of any gravitational theory which could represent a reliable 
alternative to Einstein’s. 
Dicke also invented the microwave radiometer and described the cosmic background radiation 
discovered by Penzias and Wilson in 1964 as relic of the primeval fireball. At about 1955 he dedicated 
himself to the development of experimental tests of gravity, evaluating the existing proofs in favour of 
general relativity and submitting to a severe analysis Einstein’s principle of equivalence. 
The eventuality of a varying G surely intrigued him (as the Brans/Dicke theory testifies), but at the 
same time he surely didn’t share Dirac’s rationalistic approach to mathematical physics with his 
invocation to „elegance, simplicity and perfection”.75 
As to the peculiar coincidence between αG-1 and the present age of the universe, Dicke concluded that 
there was no need at all to invoke a variability of G. To explain that coincidence it was in fact sufficient 
to re-consider the statistical premises of Dirac’s reasoning, without indulging in conclusions based on 
aesthetic criteria. In short, while for Dirac the present epoch has obtained completely fortuitous; 
according to Dicke the age „now” is „not random" but rather „conditioned" by „biological factors"76, 
because we can say in advance that the existence of observers (i.e.: carbon based life forms) is allowed 
only on a limited temporal range of the evolutionary history of the universe.  
Dicke stated that we (and whatever chemically complex alien civilization) may observe the universe 
only in those epochs that present the necessary conditions for our own existence since 1957, but the 
clearest (although probably the less known) illustration of his argument was advanced in occasion of the 
Joseph Henry Lecture held in front of the Philosophical Society of Washington on April 18, 1958. There 
he affirmed77: 
 
To infer the time dependence of the gravitational interaction requires more than a simple observation that the 
reciprocal of the gravitational constant and the age of the universe, when expressed dimensionlessly, are now 
nearly equal. It is also necessary to assume that now is a random time. But is it? 
The present epoch is conditioned by the fact that the biological conditions for the existence of man must be 
satisfied. This requires the existence of a planetary system and a hot star. If we assume an evolutionary 
cosmology starting with the formation of hydrogen 12 billion years ago, there is an upper limit for the epoch of 
man which is imposed by the following two conditions: First, hydrogen is being continually converted to helium 
and heavier elements. Perhaps 20% has already been "burned." Second, there is an upper limit on the radiating 
life of a star. 
If the star is massive (10 times the sun's mass) it lives riotously, burning its hydrogen like a wastrel. For a light 
star (1/10 the sun's mass), hydrogen is burned slowly and the star is capable of living much longer than the sun, 
                                                
74
 Among the innumerable contributions to a question which posed more interrogatives than solutions, Jordan proposed 
various cosmological models inspired by Dirac’s LNH; Bondi discussed widely the topic of large numbers coincidences in 
his classic textbook Cosmology; Hoyle affronted the theme in many occasions; Oskar Klein tried to elaborate a solution in 
the context of a cosmological model completely different from both evolutionary and steady-state theories. See the sources 
quoted on n. 65 above for further details. 
75
 Dicke, R.H.: Gravitation without a principle of equivalence, Reviews of  Modern Physics 29, 1957, p. 363-376, on p. 363. 
76
 Ibid., p. 375. A similar argument was almost incidentally delineated by Eddington in his Messengers Lectures of 1934. 
Discussing the eventuality of a fortuitous deviation of entropy from its maximum value”, he said: the year 1934 is not a 
random date between t=-∞ and t=+∞. We must not argue that because fluctuations of the present magnitude occupy only 
1/xth of the time between t=-∞ and t=+∞, therefore the chances are x to 1 against such a fluctuation existing in the year 
1934. For our present purpose the important characteristic of the year 1934 is that it is selected as belonging to a period 
during which there exist in the universe beings capable of speculating about the universe and its fluctuations. It is clear that 
such creatures could not exist near thermodynamical equilibrium. Therefore it is perfectly fair for the supporters of this 
suggestion to wipe out of the calculation all those multillions of years during which the fluctuations are less than the 
minimum required to permit of the evolution and the existence of mathematical physicists". See Eddington, A.S.: New 
pathways in science, Cambridge 1935, p. 65 
77
 Dicke, R.H.: Gravitation-an enigma, American Scientist 47, 1959, p. 25-40, on p. 33 (Dicke’s italics). The paper appeared 
originally in 1958 on the Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, vol. 48. 
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100 times as long. However, if the star is much smaller than this, its central temperature never rises high enough 
to cause nuclear reactions to take place. Such a light star radiates until its gravitational energy is gone and then it 
cools off. It is seen therefore that the longest life of a star is very roughly 1014 years and this puts an upper limit to 
the epoch of man. 
There is also a lower limit on the epoch of man. With the assumption that initially only hydrogen exists, it is 
necessary to produce other elements in the stellar caldrons and distribute them about the universe before a 
planetary system of our type can be formed. It is a bit difficult to estimate this time, but it would seem that 1 
billion years would be a reasonable lower bound on the epoch of man. 
It is thus seen that the epoch of man is not random but is very roughly delineated. 
 
The consecration of the abovementioned argument came only after the publication of a letter by Dicke 
in the November 4, 1961 issue of Nature. That letter, where the Princeton’s physicist gave to his 
arguments a definite mathematical formulation, is now very famous among scholars, especially for that 
passage stating that the Hubble age of the universe „is not a ‘random choice’ from a wide range of 
possible choices, but is limited by the criteria for the existence of physicists”.78 
Dirac replied immediately79 and – although admitting not to have a „decisive argument” against Dicke’s 
„assumption” – wrote in favour of his LNH because it enabled an indefinite existence of habitable 
planets and the consequent possibility of a never ending life.80 
Preferring a theory that admits an eternal presence of life in the universe could appear curious, but it 
surely wasn’t a new argument. For instance, Tolman called the eventual reduction of humanity to a 
„transitory and improbable phenomenon“ an „emotional" (rather than intellectually founded) objection 
to Boltzmann’s hypothesis81, while Sciama confessed around 1960 that one of the „most important” 
issue in favour of the steady-state was that of being „the only model in which it seems evident that life 
will continue somewhere”.82 
Dicke, on his part, argued in retrospect to have suggested a „very conservative statement” to a „rather 
straightforward question”.83 Also, when his argument became known as an application of the weak 
anthropic principle, he affirmed that there was nothing of particularly „exciting” in it when confronted 
with the idea of a „natural selection of the natural constants” that was contemplated some years later by 
Brandon Carter.84 
  
5. BECOMING AWARE OF THE DELICATE BALANCE 
 
The 1960ies saw the gradual affirmation of the standard general relativistic hot big bang model as the 
result of various factors. Apart from the already mentioned evidences deriving from the surveys of 
distant radiosources and the accumulation of other astrophysical evidence (concerning quasars, X-ray 
sources, etc.) the two basic proofs that corroborated the model were the theoretical capacity of 
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 Dicke, R.H.: Dirac's cosmology and Mach's principle, Nature 192, 1961, p. 440-441. Quotation from p. 440. 
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 Dirac’s reply follows immediately after Dicke’s letter on Nature 192, 1961, p. 441. 
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 Tolman, R.C.: On the entropy…, p. 1642. 
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American Institute of Physics' collection. See: www.aip.org ). 
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 R.H. Dicke in Lightman, A.-Brawer, R.: Origins, the lives and worlds of modern cosmologists, Harvard 1990, p. 210-211. 
Cf. also Dicke’s opinions as referred in Pagels, H.R.: A cozy cosmology, Sciences 25, 1985, p. 34-38. 
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 Cf. Misner, C.W.-Thorne, K.-Wheeler, J.A.: Gravitation, San Francisco 1973, p. 1217. 
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predicting the observed abundances of light atomic nuclei and the discovery of the microwave 
background radiation. Together with (or: as part of) the newly emerging paradigm, the period was 
characterized by an increasing rapprochement between cosmology and particle physics and by the 
formulation of the essential mathematical background needed for the study of the causal structure of 
space-time and the meaning of singularities. 
A particularly important centre for the development of new ideas, methods and techniques was surely 
Cambridge’s DAMTP (Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics) where a new 
generation of researchers (including Hawking, Rees and Ellis) developed new ideas under the 
supervision of Dennis Sciama. Because of the presence of Hoyle and the inheritance of people like 
Eddington and Dirac, Cambridge already represented an ideal place for cosmological studies.85 
Sciama’s relativity group gathered some of the best minds assuring them „a certain structure and 
someone who was willing to take them on”.86 
Carter was one of Sciama’s students: born in Sydney in 1942, he arrived at DAMTP around 1964 and 
got his Ph.D. in applied mathematics and theoretical physics in 1968. The largest part of his published 
papers of the 1960ies and early 1970ies were dedicated to the Kerr solutions of Einstein’s field 
equations (i.e: those exact solutions that describe the field of rotating black holes) or to other technical 
problems related with the global properties of exact solutions in general relativity. In these fields Carter 
obtained relevant results, including a theorem that now bears his name87 and the demonstration of the 
existence of a family of charged Kerr solutions.88 
In 1967 Carter drew up a long type-written preprint devoted to the role of fundamental microphysical 
parameters in cosmogony which remained unpublished.89 This was conceived as the first part of a 
projected work (called the significance of numerical coincidences in nature) aimed to furnish an 
„unified treatment” and a „readily accessible and comprehensible” survey of numerical coincidences 
emerging from physics and astrophysics. In short, the paper represented a stimulating exercise of what 
Victor Weisskopf would call qualitative physics90: a genre of physical discussion which had some 
forerunners (from Galilei’s reflections on the size of the animals attributed to Salviati in the second day 
of his Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche91 to Edwin E. Salpeter’s speculations of the mid 1960ies)92 
and a long list of successors93 and that, in Carter's words, concerned „the manner in which familiar local 
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 See for instance Hawking’s reminiscences in: Stephen Hawking’s 60 years in a nutshell, lecture presented at The future of 
theoretical physics and cosmology: Stephen Hawking 60th Birthday symposium (held  in Cambridge, on  January 11,  2002) 
and now available on the web: http://plus.maths.org/issue18/features/hawking/ . See also Ellis, G.F.R.: Obituary: Dennis 
Sciama (1926-99), Nature 403, 2000,  p. 722. 
86
 D. Sciama in: Lightman, A.-Brawer, R.: Origins…, p. 144. 
87
 Carter, B.: Axisymmetric black hole has only two degrees of freedom, Physical Review Letters 26, 1971, p. 331-332. Cf 
Hawking, S.W.–Ellis, G.F.R.: The large scale structure of space-time, Cambridge 1973, p. 331. Carter proved that stationary 
axisymmetric asympotically flat vacuums with an event horizon form disjoint two-parameter families of exact solutions in 
general relativity, only one of which contains the Schwarschild solution; namely, the Kerr family of vacuum solutions. 
88
 Carter, B.: Global structure of the Kerr family of gravitational fields, Physical Review 174, 1968, p. 1559-1571. Cf. 
Sciama’s reminiscences in Lightman, A.-Brawer, R.: Origins…, p. 144/145. 
89
 Carter, B.: The significance of numerical coincidences in nature. Part 1: the role of fundamental physical parameters in 
cosmogony, DAMTP preprint, University of Cambridge 1967, 67 pages including the bibliography. 
90
 Weisskopf, V.F.: Of atoms, mountains, and stars: A study in qualitative physics, Science 187, 1975, p. 605-612 
91
 Galilei, G.: Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche, intorno a due nuove scienze attenenti alla mecanica & I movimenti 
locali, Leiden 1638 (now available on: 
www.liberliber.it/biblioteca/g/galilei/discorsi_e_dimostrazioni_matematiche_intorno_a_due_nuove_etc/html/) 
92
 Salpeter, E.E.: Dimensionless ratios and stellar structure, in: Perspectives in modern physics. Essays in honor of Hans A. 
Bethe, Marshak, R.E. (ed.), New York 1966, p. 463-475. 
93
 E.g.: Weiskoppf, V.F.: Modern physics from an elementary point of view, Lectures given in the Summer Vacation 
Programme 1969, CERN Yellow Report 70-8, 1970, unpublished; Dyson, F.J.: Energy in the universe, Scientific American 
224, September 1971, p. 51-59; Silk, J.: Cosmogony and the magnitude of the dimensionless gravitational coupling 
constants, Nature 265, 1977, p. 710-711; Carr, B.J.-Rees, M.J.: The anthropic principle and the structure of the physical 
world, Nature 278, 1979, p. 605-612; Squires, E.J.: Do we live in the simplest interesting world?, European Journal of 
Physics 2, 1981, p. 55-57; Reeves, H.: On the origin of the forces, in: The birth of the Universe. La naissance de l'univers,  
Audouze, J.-Tran Thanh Van, J. (eds.), Gif sur Yvette 1982, p. 369-391; Press, W.H.-Lightman, A.P.: Dependence of 
macrophysical phenomena on the values of the fundamental constants, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
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phenomena depend qualitatively, and in order of magnitude, quantitatively on the fundamental 
parameters of microphysics”.94 
The author explored in particular the role and consequences of a series of „relations and coincidences" 
obtained through the composition of the following six fundamental parameters: 
 
- the pseudo-scalar coupling constant of strong interactions gs95, which is approximately 4 in the 
so called Planck units; i.e. those fundamental units such that c = G = h/2pi = 196 
- the electron charge e (≈ 1/12 in the above-mentioned units)97 
- the nucleon mass mN  (≈ ½ X 10-19)98 
- the ratio between the pion (pi-meson) mass and the nucleon mass, mpi/mN ≈ 1/7, which suggests 
the „maximum effective range of the strong interactions” 
- the ratio between the mass of the electron and that of the nucleon: me/mN ≈ 1/1830 
- the ratio between the difference between neutron and proton mass and the mass of the nucleon, 
∆
 N/mN  ≈ 1/730. 
 
From the interplay of these parameters it is possible to show not only that the sizes and masses of the 
planets and the stars must lie in certain typical ranges, but that they have a fundamental role in 
determining „the character of all important natural phenomena” with the exception of those where high 
energy physics or cosmological quantities are directly involved. Carter showed how (apart from 
„relatively small adjustment factors”) most of the „limiting masses of astrophysics arise (in fundamental 
units) simply as the reciprocal of the gravitational fine structure constant”. There was only one notable 
exception, and to point this out represented the most significant result reached in the 1967 unpublished 
paper. 
This exception concerns the positioning of the dividing line which distinguishes main sequence stars 
(i.e.: stable hydrogen’s burning stars) that transport energy mainly by convection (i.e.: red dwarfs) from 
those in which energy is dissipated mainly by radiative transport (i.e.: blue giants).99  Carter showed 
that this line „occurs within the range of main sequence stars only as a consequence of the rather exotic 
coincidence that the ninth power of the electromagnetic fine structure constant [i.e.: e2 in Carter’s 
notation] is roughly equal to the square root of the gravitational fine structure constant”100. This 
coincidence implied indeed a delicate balance.  „Had it been the 11th power", he wrote, „all main 
sequence stars would be convective red dwarfs”. This observation, which prompted some crucial 
developments, will be re-considered below. 
Notice that the connection between  „most of the large numbers of cosmogony" and powers of αG-1 was 
known since the 1930ies. The merit of Carter lies not only in gathering a series of results, but also in 
explicitly warning against „misconceptions” as those elaborated by Pascual Jordan.101 Jordan, in fact, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
constants of nature, unpublished 32-pages preprint, 1987 (a short version with the same title appeared in: American Journal 
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conjectured an „unconventional” cosmological mechanism (involving the age of the universe as in 
Dirac’s LNH) to give an explanation of that large-number coincidence which relates the upper limit of 
the number of nucleons contained in a star and αG-3/2. 
Although this coincidence was a genuine finding, there was no need to postulate any new physics to 
explain it. Jordan’s coincidence is in fact predictable in terms of the ordinary theory of stellar evolution, 
taking into account that the masses of stable stars are necessarily related to the Landau/Chandrasekhar 
limiting mass.102  It is enough to realize that „no normal stable star can exist with a nucleon number 
which differs from the Landau number [N
 L ≡ ML/MN ≡ MN-3 in Carter’s units] by more than a factor of 
order 102”.103 
In other words we cannot have the formation of a star with M << ML, because if that were the case 
gravity would be balanced by quantum mechanical pressure due to the exclusion principle as it actually 
happens in the case of planets. At the same time we cannot have the formation of a star with M > 102ML 
because such an object would be very unstable due to the predominance of radiation pressure. 
 
6. FROM COGNIZABILITY TO THE ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE 
 
Brandon Carter himself does not remember today what happened to the second part of his 1967 
paper.104 We know anyway that his „ultimate purpose” was there „to clarify the significance” of the 
coincidence between αG-1 and H0-1[(mpc2pi)/h].105 
According to Carter, that coincidence should have been „fully explained in principle (although many 
relevant details remain uncalculable in practice) in terms of conventional physics and cosmology" 
without the recourse to „revolutionary departures" such as the LNH or Eddington’s Fundamental 
Theory. Programmatically he then stated that the „final task” of the 1967 preprint was to furnish the 
formulae which illustrate the „connection between local and cosmological quantities … via the 
timescales of stellar evolution” in terms of microphysical parameters. 
If not the second part of that paper, the promised follow-up came out three years later in the form of a 
new 13-page-typescript for the Clifford Memorial Meeting held at Princeton University on February 21, 
1970.  On that occasion, with Wheeler and Dyson in the audience, Carter expressed the purpose to 
„clarify” the „various much publicised” large number coincidences „in terms of standard physical 
theory in conjunction with the orthodox hot big bang model of the universe”.106 
He classified the „coincidences and interrelations" amongst the large adimensional numbers of 
„cosmogonical” interest in three distinct categories: 
- The first one included coincidences whose explanation was accounted for completely in terms of 
“objective certainties” (i.e.: without requiring any recourse to „statistical probabilities") without leaving 
current physics and astrophysics. Jordan's coincidence represented an example of this category. 
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- „Category (II)" contemplated „those coincidences whose explanation, although straightforward, 
requires subjective and probabilistic considerations relating to our own position as observers in the 
universe”. It included, of course, the Dirac/Dicke coincidence.107 
- To category (III) belonged: 
 
those coincidences which cannot be given a direct physical explanation since they depend more or less critically on the 
actual values of fundamental or microphysical constants, but which nevertheless could in principle have been predicted in 
advance of their observational discovery on the ground that they are necessary preconditions for the existence of observers 
(ourselves) in the universe. 
 
As example of this kind of coincidences Carter invoked the relation elaborated by Sciama on 1953 in 




 ≈ 1 
 
According to Carter, this expression109 „could have been predicted from the conventional idea that the 
density irregularities in the form of galaxies, stars etc, which are presumably necessary for our own 
existence, grew from initially small perturbations of the homogeneous background”. 
Once accepted the „conventional” theory according to which galaxies form by condensation, starting as 
small density fluctuations of the homogeneous FLRW background, the task became to make evident the 
biological constraints that the fact itself of our existence (being the growing of initial density 
irregularities, and hence the formation of galaxies, a necessary pre-condition for the emergence of life), 
imposes not simply on our temporal location in the universe but on some fundamental characteristics of 
the universe itself. In this case, Carter firstly choose two „independent constants” which are responsible 
of the dynamics of the FLRW background (and consequently of the temporal evolution of parameters 
such as the Hubble constant H, the curvature K, the average density ρ and the black body temperature 
T):  
- the ratio between the baryon number density (which is a conserved quantity) and the third power 
of the cosmological black body temperature in a certain time  ≡ nb/T3 (which „represents roughly the 
ratio of the mean non relativistic gas pressure to the electromagnetic black body radiation”) 
- the curvature scalar of the homogeneous 3-space sections at constant cosmic time110  ≡ K/T2 
He then pointed out at the fact that, according to the Fridman equations, we may have Sciama’s 
coincidence only if curvature does not dominate on matter density at present time, and argued at last the 
biological constraints on  deriving from the need that density irregularities transformed effectively in 
galaxies at some moment of the evolutionary history of the universe. 
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 (being G = 1) 
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To guarantee the growth of density irregularities, Carter firstly underlined that one must allow for the 
decoupling of matter from radiation pressure; an event that requires that T drops „well below"111 the 
Rydberg ionization energy.112 Additionally, he noticed that one must have the curvature K not too 
different in order of magnitude from the density at the time of decoupling. In fact, if K had had „a too 
strongly negative value” the kinetic energy of expansion would have dominated the potential energy, 
making impossible the re-contraction of the perturbations under the action of gravity and causing their 
dispersal together with the expansion of the universe. If, to the contrary, K had had a too strongly 
positive value it would have provoked an early contraction of the whole universe, with the consequent 
destruction of the developing condensations. 
In the light of these two considerations Carter concluded that our existence (or if you want: the 
possibility of galaxy formation) imposes the inequality (in Planck’s units) 
 
|| << 10-2e4me(mN+10-2e4me) 
 
in order to restrict the present value of K so to account for Sciama’s coincidence within the 
observational accuracy available. 
He also suggested that the coincidence between the number of baryons in the visible universe and the 
square of αG-1, which had become famous through Eddington’s papers, appeared as a consequence of 
Sciama’s relation once the present age of the universe was accounted for.113 
Apart from these rather technical details a crucial aspect was, at any rate, Carter’s awareness that it was 
hard to ascribe the status of a proper physical explanation to the arguments exploited to predict 
Sciama’s relation. Physicists were used to extend the available knowledge in order to derive parameters 
previously taken as fundamental from „something more basic”, but this surely wasn't the case here.  
It is at this point that the concept of an „ensemble of universes” appeared for the first time, invoked as 
an essential element to promote the kind of reasoning illustrated above in the case of the growth of 
density irregularities – which is often labelled as an anthropic prediction – to the status of explanation. 
Carter wrote114: 
 
However it is worth bearing in mind that all category III predictions can be raised automatically to the status of 
genuine explanations if we are willing to adopt some sort of statistical world-ensemble philosophy. In this type of  
philosophy one postulates the existence of an ensemble of universes characterized by all possible combinations 
of initial conditions and fundamental constants (the distinction between these concepts, which is not at all clear 
cut, being that the former refer to essentially local and the latter to essentially global features) with some 
probability measure, the assignment of which presents a deep problem. The measure problem can however be by-
passed to a considerable extent, because the existence of any organism describable as an observer will only be 
conceivable for certain restricted combinations of the fundamental constants, which distinguish within the world-
ensemble an exceptional cognizable subset, to which our own universe must necessarily belong. (more detailed, 
but for practical purposes unfeasible, consideration of the detailed local conditions would distinguish within the 
cognizable subset a cognate subset in which observers actually occur.) A category III prediction is equivalent to a 
demonstration that the features under consideration is common to all members of the cognisable subset, which 
thus explains why it is present in our own universe. 
 
With the introduction of this world-ensemble philosophy Carter attempted to define no less than a new 
goal to physical inquiry. He described it as the aim to show that115: 
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the cognizable subset is so closely circumscribed that the principal global constants, while remaining genuinely 
fundamental, are nevertheless forced to have values very close to those actually observed. 
 
In practice this appears as a „very hard” task, but what is relevant here is above all a matter of principle. 
Once accepted as a premise that some characteristics (as, for instance, the fact of being composed of 
chemical elements produced in stellar interiors or the need for habitable planets steadily heated by stars) 
must be common prerequisites for the  existence of all the possible forms of intelligent life in the 
universe, we could concentrate ourselves on finding „a fairly complete system of restrictions on the 
values of fundamental constants”. In other words we could think to collect all the „necessary 
restrictions” that the presence of biological complexity imposes on the values of fundamental constants 
in any possible cognizable universe. 
The peculiar examples advanced by Carter exploited of course many of the relations discussed in 
1967.116 He showed for instance that if the coupling constant of the strong interactions gS2 was only a 
little weaker, there would be only hydrogen around; while if it had had a little larger value  probably we 
would have „stable nuclei of an almost unlimited size”.117 Particular attention was given to the 
„remarkable coincidence” that governs the subdivision between red dwarfs and blue giants.118 This 
time, Carter underlined how critical the order of magnitude of αG-1 (rather than that of α-1) was and 
advanced a „potential category III explanation” of the weakness of that coupling constant. He suggested 
that119: 
 
the formation of a planetary system may be dependent on the passage of a star through a Hayashi convective 
phase shortly before reaching the main sequence. Since planetary formation theory is not yet on a sound footing 
this idea is of course entirely speculative, but empirical evidence in its favour is provided by the observation that 
red dwarfs, which are still convective and middle sized stars like the sun, which left the Hayashi phase only just 
before reaching the main sequences, have much lower angular momenta than blue giants – the implication being 
that the former but not the latter lost angular momentum in forming planets. If this idea is correct, then a universe 
in which the gravitational coupling is significantly stronger than the value given by [e20 ≈ mN] would not merely 
lack convective stars on or near the main sequence, but would in consequence have no planets and therefore no 
people. 
 
Speculative as it is120, this argument testifies above all the attempt to render acceptable the category III 
predictions as explanations. 
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here that their „belief that Carter’s [1967] work should appear in print provided the original motivation for writing” their 
celebrated essay. 
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 On these points Cf also Carr, B.J.-Rees, M.J.: The anthropic principle …., p. 611 and Barrow, J.D.-Tipler, F.J.: The 
anthropic cosmological …, p. 398-400. 
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range of two orders of magnitude. This practice was for instance justified by Dirac in his early papers on LNH. See in 
particular: Dirac, P.A.M.: A new basis for cosmology, Proceedings of the Royal Society A165, 1938, p. 199-208. 
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coupling constants”. In this perspective αG-1 „would be explained as the least extreme value compatible with the existence of 
observers” producing a new kind of explanation that should be classified as category IV.  
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 See the remarks on Barrow, J.D.-Tipler, F.J.: The anthropic cosmological …, p. 336. 
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As noted by Carter in the concluding part of the 1970 talk, all depends on „one’s attitude to the world-
ensemble concept”121 or, to better say, on the acceptance of „the idea that there exist many universes, of 
which only one can be known to us”. Although „philosophically objectionable” at first sight, a similar 
conception recurred on various occasions in the 1960ies and, to be honest, also before. 
Of course we should now clarify the meaning of the plural universes, but I can only hint at this very 
delicate question here. In short, if the word universe means (as it does) an all-inclusive physical whole, 
every recourse to the plural form should simply imply a misuse of language.122 In spite of this fact 
cosmologists have anyway used that plural since the very early days of relativistic cosmology123, not 
only with reference to different theoretical world-models but also intending causally disjointed regions 
within a certain model (as, in particular, in the context of the so called Eddington-Lemaitre model, a 
particular type of the FLRW class of models124 where expansion is accelerated by the presence of a 
positive cosmological constant and „disconnected universes”125 are generated every time that „neither 
light nor any other causal influence” will be able to pass from one region to another126). 
However, if we agree on terminology we could talk properly of different universes also in the case of 
separated regions of a universe that is inhomogeneous on a very large scale as the one depicted by Idlis. 
In the 1960ies talk on many universes became relatively common when, motivated by different aims, 
various authors extended their speculations well beyond the Eddington-Lemaitre or any other of the 
FLRW models. As an example let me recall here the attempt (due to Fred Hoyle and Jayant V. Narlikar) 
of saving the concept of global stationarity through a „radical departure” from  the original steady state 
model.127 Hoyle and Narlikar postulated that, on a very large scale, there were many „individual 
regions” possessing different physical properties; similar scenarios were presented – almost in the same 
period – by Jaroslav Pachner and Ronald Gordon Giovanelli.128 
What matters here is that the concept of causally separated regions in a larger (if not infinite) space-
time, found many different representations before 1970. Carter, on his part, added something to the 
Boltzmann /Idlis scenario; to wit, the idea that different universes may exhibit peculiar values of the 
constants of nature. He was not simply imagining regions of the universe where parameters as the 
temperature or the mean density may assume different values, but rather an ensemble of universes each 
regulated by a different physical phenomenology. 
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 Cf. Carter, B.: Large number coincidences…, p. 298. 
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 On the topic see for instance: Munitz,  M.K.: Our universe or many?, Journal of the History of Ideas 12, 1951, p. 231-
255; Space, time and creation, Glencoe, Illinois 1957; Cosmic understanding. Philosophy and science of the universe, 
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wrongly deserve that label only for universes with null cosmological constant. 
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annual general meeting, Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 91, p. 412-416, on p. 415. Causally disjointed 
regions in an accelerating universe are presently under scrutiny again, after that observations of Type Ia supernovae have 
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instance Chiueh, T.-Xiao-Gang, H.: Future island universes in a background Universe accelerated by cosmological constant 
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 Eddington, A.S.: The expanding universe, Cambridge 1933 
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 Hoyle, F.-Narlikar, J.V.: A radical departure from the 'steady state' concept in cosmology, Proceedings of the Royal 
Society A290, 1966, p. 162-176. 
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 Pachner, J.: Dynamics of the universe, Acta Physica Polonica 19, 1960, p. 663-673; Giovanelli, R.G.: A fluctuation 
theory of cosmology, Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 127, 1964, p. 461-469. In early 1970ies another 
important theorist of the steady state advanced the idea that very dense clusters of galaxies could appear as closed sub-units 
or universes. See: Gold, T.: Multiple universes, Nature 242, 1973, p. 24-25. 
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To say it clearly, Carter was describing a metaspace of universes whose constants were free to assume 
all possible values. We must note, anyway, that he denied as „unconventional” the temporal variation of 
the fundamental constants in any single member of the metaspace, maintaining that in each particular 
universe the peculiar values of the constants, once fixed, was maintained for the whole of its 
evolutionary history. 
A conception of co-existing universes of this kind129 was presumably derived from three distinct 
sources. Firstly, from the lectures held in Cambridge in the early 1960ies by biologist Charles Pantin 
(that Rees remembers to have attended together with Carter130); secondly, from the „unconventional” 
scenario of separated bubbles described by Hoyle and Narlikar around 1966131; thirdly, and mainly, 
from the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics due to Hugh Everett which became called 
many worlds interpretation after de Witt contributions.132 
It is in fact the de Witt-Wheeler interpretation of Everett’s proposal, with its description of a universe133 
possessing „many branches, only one of which can be known to any well defined individual observer, 
but all of which are equally real”, that Carter invoked in his 1970 paper in association with the 
„statistical ensemble” requested by Category III explanations. 
„Everett philosophy” – as Carter baptised it – not only appeared as „the only interpretation of quantum 
theory … which makes sense in cosmological contexts”, but also as the appropriate and natural tool for 




7. THE ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE(S) 
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 The expression co-existing universes is mediated from a classification due to George Gale (see: Gale, G.: Cosmological 
fecundity …). He distinguished three classes of many universes scenarios: „spatially multiple universes”, „temporally 
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his exposition which is centred on the concept of possibility). Ambiguous as it is, Gale’s classification is at bottom nothing 
more that the re-elaboration of the Medieval distinction among the innumerable speculations on many worlds which 
followed Etienne Temper’s decree of 1277. On this last point cf. in particular Duhem, P.M.M.: Medieval cosmology: 
theories of infinity, place, time, void, and the plurality of worlds, Chicago 1986. 
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 Rees, M.J.: Before the beginning …, p. 259. Pantin suggested in particular that „if we could know that our own Universe 
was only one of an indefinite number with varying properties we could perhaps invoke a solution analogous to the principle 
of Natural Selection; that only in certain universes, which happen to include ours, are the conditions suitable for the 
existence of life, and unless that condition is fulfilled there will be no observers to note the fact." Cf Pantin, C.F.A.: Life and 
the conditions of existence, in: Biology and Personality, Ramsey, I.T. (ed.), Oxford 1965, p. 83-106, on p. 103-104. 
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 Carter alluded to a peculiar aspect of Hoyle and Narlikar work in Carter, B.: The complete analytic extension of the 
Reissner-Nordström metric in the special case e2 = m2, Physics Letters 21, 1966, p. 423-424. He didn’t show, anyway, any 
clear sign of being interested at all in their new cosmological ideas. 
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 I will spend just few words on Everett’s relative state formulation of quantum mechanics here. In his original papers of 
the late 1950ies the author presented a conception in which measurement didn’t collapse the wave function to a single value. 
Everett didn’t write a lot on the topic and, apart from the purpose of saving a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, it 
remains largely unclear how this theory should work in order to give determinate measurements results. 
During the 1960ies, however, Everett’s formulation was associated with a many-worlds interpretation. This was primarily 
due to the reading of Everett by Wheeler and Bryce de Witt. The latter, in particular, suggested explicitly that the world was 
splitting in many alternative real branches as a result of quantum measurements. 
De Witt published his views at last on the pages of the September 1970 issue of Physics Today (provoking an extended 
debate, which was covered in the April 2001 issue of that journal) and then practically canonized them in an anthology of 
papers on Everett’s proposal – edited jointly with Graham – that was called The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics, a name that was there to stay. 
The MWI was destined to become a proposal seen with suspicion by almost everyone with the exception of cosmologists, 
which found in it the only way to connect the concept of a wave function of the whole universe with the embarrassing 
eventuality to conceive an observer external to the universe itself. 
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 Or to better say: of „the state vector of the universe” 
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Five/six years after the discovery of the cosmic microwave background the hot big bang model was on 
the verge to become standard and to enter in textbooks as a paradigm.134 The consecration of the model, 
which consisted essentially in the physical description of the evolution of the early expanding universe 
from 10-2 seconds after the big bang to the decoupling at the end of the radiation era, was in fact 
canonized early in the 1970ies in a long series of books and papers.135 
Clearly the model was not (and still is not) a complete theory. Just to give some examples, the 
formation of cosmic structures, the peculiar features of the hadronic era or of those which preceded it, 
or the initial singularity itself all remained problems unsolved in the context of the model itself and 
waiting for further physical advancements. 
In effect is hard to say today what Carter exactly meant with conventional or orthodox physics. If 
orthodox stands for accepted knowledge in a certain moment, we must not forget that many aspects of 
the soon-to-come standard model of elementary particle physics were still part of a work in progress in 
the early 1970ies. At the same time, the emerging paradigm produced new enigmas, among them the 
first discussions of the so called flatness and horizon problems.136 
These problems contributed to transform the fears of an oversimplification of FLRW cosmologies that 
pestered the researchers of the 1930ies into a series of interrogatives on the peculiar features of the 
actual universe. In particular, the isotropy of the microwave background became a fact in need of a 
coherent explanation rather than an ideal (and presumably oversimplified) assumption. 
In the second part of the 1960ies cosmologists began to follow two main schools: some invoked a 
mechanism capable to smooth the universe content in the very early evolutionary phases137; while 
others took the observed situation at its face-value posing questions on the peculiarity of initial 
conditions. 
The Dicke/Carter philosophy, as it was soon called138, found a collocation in this second school when it 
was used by Collins and Hawking to establish how peculiar were the initial conditions that generate the 
observed spatially isotropic universe with respect to the set of initial conditions of all possible spatially 
homogeneous universes that emerge as solutions of Einstein’s field equations (with a minimum of 
physical assumptions on the energy contents). 
In their paper of 1973 the two English physicists regarded indeed Carter’s ideas on a very large number 
of universes as the „most attractive answer”139 to the puzzling situation that our highly isotropic 
                                                
134
 Take care of the fact that almost everything cosmologists use the term paradigm in a sense very different from Kuhn. In 
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universe. The Jayne Lectures for 1969, Philadelphia 1970. That paper anticipated indeed of a decade or so the famous Dicke, 
R.H.-Peebles, J.; The big bang cosmology-Enigmas and nostrums, in: General relativity: an Einstein centenary survey, 
Hawking, S.W.-Israel, W. (eds.), Cambridge 1979, p. 504-517. 
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 After: Misner, C.W.: Transport processes in the primordial fireball, Nature 214, 1967, p. 40-41; Neutrino viscosity and 
the isotropy of primordial blackbody radiation, Physical Review Letters 19, 1967, p. 533-535; The isotropy of the universe, 
Astrophysical Journal 151, 1968, p. 431-457. 
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 By both Wheeler and Collins and Hawking. 
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 Collins, C.B.-Hawking, S.W.: Why is the universe isotropic?, Astrophysical Journal 180, 1973, p. 317-334, on p. 334. A 
first draft of the paper was received by the Astrophysical Journal on June 29, 1972. A revised version followed on 
September 25, 1972. 
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universe was of „measure zero in the space of all homogeneous models”.140 Consequently they 
concluded141: 
 
From the existence of the unstable anisotropic mode it follows that nearly all of the universes become highly 
anisotropic. However these universes would not be expected to contain galaxies, since condensations can grow 
only in universes in which the rate of expansion is just sufficient to avoid recollapse. The existence of galaxies 
would seem to be a necessary precondition for the development of any form of intelligent life. Thus there will be 
life only in those universes which tend toward isotropy at large times. The fact that we have observed the 
universe to be isotropic is therefore only a consequence of our own existence. 
 
The Collins/Hawking paper was not the only one that invoked Carter’s line of thought before it first 
appeared in a publication in 1974. Freeman Dyson (who was probably the first to appeal in 1972 at 
something as Carter's principle of cognizability on print) esteemed Carter’s „speculative arguments” 
and his extension of Dicke’s ideas142; Martin Rees expounded Carter ideas and terminology on a couple 
of occasions, arguing amongst other things that Dicke’s coincidence had to be „automatically satisfied” 
in any cognizable universe.143 Also Tryon was presumably influenced by Carter’s ideas (although he 
didn’t quote him) in introducing a „principle of biological selection, which states that any universe in 
which sentient beings find themselves is necessarily hospitable to sentient beings" in his paper on the 
creation of the universe out of nothing.144 
A strong support for Carter’s perspectives then came from John Archibald Wheeler, who linked the 
world-ensemble concept with his cyclical model, where new closed universes with different values of 
various fundamental parameters emerged after the Big Crunch of a previous universe.145 Already in 
December 1967, when discussing the concept of superspace, Wheeler contemplated the „thought-
provoking” ideas of his Princeton colleague Dicke, when addressing the question as to „why then do we 
happen to be living in that part of superspace where we find ourselves?”.146 In the early 1970ies he 
quoted several times the Dicke/Carter’s philosophy and Carter's still unpublished arguments.147 In 
particular, at the symposium on the development of the physicist's conception of nature held in Trieste 
on September 1972, Wheeler had the following verbal exchange with Dirac148: 
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J.A. Wheeler: How do you feel about the explanation of Brandon Carter that many cycles of the universe are 
possible and the constants in this particular cycle are such as will permit life? 
P.A.M. Dirac: That doesn't get over the difficulty that you have to explain this very big number
 
 
In the end Wheeler asked Carter „to say something for the record” on his ideas. In other words: to 
publish something on a subject by now widely discussed in the community of astrophysicists and 
cosmologists but that is author, even considering it „potentially fertile”, still believed in need of „further 
development”.149 
       The opportunity arrived in occasion of the 63th symposium of the IAU, held in Cracow from 10th to 12th 
September 1973. That meeting, dedicated to the Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with 
Observation, coincided with the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of Copernicus’ birth and Carter 
spoke in the section devoted to the structure of singularities. Before Carter’s talk, Hawking repeated 
that the „only explanation” of the isotropy of the universe was that founded on the suggestions of Dicke 
and Carter himself150, while Wheeler (chairman on that day) pointed out that Hawking, Dicke „and 
Carter have touched such an interesting topic as the question whether man is involved in the design of 
the universe in a much more central way that one can previously imagine”.151 
It was indeed in some sense paradoxical that, in front of an audience gathered to address „tribute to the 
creator of the first scientific cosmological theory”152, Carter remarked immediately that his intervention 
consisted: „basically of a reaction against exaggerated subservience to the Copernican principle”.153 
Following Bondi, he intended here that criterion according to which we avoid to consider the Earth in a 
„central, specially favoured position”154; a criterion that, „unfortunately”, has been sometime extended 
in a dogmatic manner. 
Carter had in mind all those assumptions which invoke an extension of the usual cosmological principle 
to time in spite of Dicke’s arguments and, in particular, that perfect cosmological principle which was 
assumed as a dogma in developing the steady-state model.155 He underlined that the universe „is by no 
means homogeneous on a local scale” (say < 100 Mpc), aiming at last to pronounce (as he later 
wrote)156: 
 
a warning to astrophysical and cosmological theorists of the risk of error in the interpretation of astronomical and 
cosmological information unless due account is taken of the biological restraints under which the information was 
acquired. 
 
In other words, in 1973 Carter cautioned his audience to avoid the error of extending improperly any 
homology or uniformity assumption. One thing was to state that the Earth is not in a central position, 
another one was to conduct (consciously or subconsciously)157 this statement to the extreme opposite, 
concluding that our position in space/time is absolutely typical and has nothing of peculiar or privileged. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
As seen, the idea of a cyclical succession of many (possibly: infinitely many) closed universes, with reprocessing of the 
values of the fundamental constants and particle masses at the beginning of any new cycle, was anyway Wheeler’s and not 
Carter’s stuff. 
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The awareness that an abuse of the hypothesis of homology could be a source of bias, led Carter to 
formulate a methodological principle in order to avoid the formulation of cosmological principles based 
on an improper extrapolation of apparent symmetries. 
The moral of all this in the case of the large adimensional numbers was that it is not necessary to 
elaborate unconventional extensions of physics and cosmology to explain the coincidences among them.  
In 1973, Carter re-named then the three categories of 1970 in accordance with what he now called the 
anthropic principle. 
Category I coincidences were said to be of a „traditional kind", while category II coincidences became 
those which require the weak anthropic principle (WAP), i.e. a precept according to which158: 
 
we must be prepared to take account of the fact that our location in the universe is necessarily privileged to the 
extent of being compatible with our existence as observers. 
 
„More questionable" as they were159, category III coincidences were said to require something more to 
be accepted as „complete physical explanations".160 I.e.: 
- either an extension of the theory itself 
- or a new philosophy which makes possible to realize a combination of the ordinary WAP with 
an hypothesis on the existence of an ensemble of connected or disconnected branches of the universe 
over which „fundamental constants would have an extended range of values".161 
 
The strong anthropic principle (SAP) was indeed a statement deriving from the „world ensemble 
philosophy”162 and according to which163 
 
the universe (and hence the fundamental parameters on which it depends) must be such as to admit the creation of 
observers within it at some stage. 
 
On this basis, Carter contemplated the eventuality of a systematical exploration of the constraints on the 
value of fundamental parameters that, at least in principle derive from the existence of living observers. 
He admitted that SAP was not a „completely satisfying" criterion and that research for solutions based 
on a deeper „mathematical structure" was still preferable. At the same time, at least choosing such a 
suggestive terminology re-calling the anthropos, he surely advanced a proposal (if not, consciously or 
subconsciously, a provocation) destined to fuel interminable debates. 
Some authors in fact soon read teleological (if not theological) implications in SAP, substituting (or 
sometime associating) a taylor-made universe for the many-universes philosophy.164 
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universe, American Scientist 65, 1977, p. 77-86 ; Eccles, J.: The human mystery, New York 1979; Dyson, F.J.: Disturbing 
the universe, New York 1979 (A paper as Wald, G.: Fitness in the universe: choices and necessities, Origins of Life 5, 1974, 
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In effect, Carter’s terminological choice recalled teleological overtones in more than a sense. For 
instance, just think to the fact that the term anthropic was coined by the Anglican theologian Frederick 
Robert Tennant who –at the end of the third decade of the XX century- aimed to a „wider teleology” in 
his Philosophical Theology.165 
It is not my aim anyway to enquiry here the debate on the anthropic reasoning developed after Carter, 
or to discuss the anthropic principle(s) from an epistemological point of view.166 I will limit myself to 
say that, during the 1980ies, Carter himself advanced an epistemological defence of his anthropic 
principle.167 In a couple of occasions he then invoked a Bayesian approach to probability and stated 
again that scientists should be cautious on extending homology or symmetry assumptions. At last, 
Carter elaborated the following general statement:  
 
Whenever one wishes to draw general conclusions from observations restricted to a small sample it is essential to 
know whether the sample should be considered to be biased, and if so how. The anthropic principle provides 
guidelines for taking account of the kind of bias that arises from the observer’s own particular situation in the 
world.168 
 
This statement confirms what the author affirmed clearly during the discussion that followed his talk at 
the Venice conference of 1988; i.e., that he presently regards the anthropic principle as a general 
principle of scientific enterprise rather than a cosmological one. 
The 1980ies anyway brought with them also big developments in cosmology and fundamental physics. 
These induced theoretical physicists to accept the idea that certain features in the structure of the 
observable universe (e.g.: its size, its average density, the photon-to-baryon ratio) are particular exits of 
peculiar initial conditions, due to symmetry breaking phase transitions or to pseudo-casual processes 
that happened in the very early evolutionary history of the universe.169 As a consequence, scenarios 
                                                                                                                                                                  
p. 7-27, with all its references to a natural selection in the universe and  to Henderson’s Fitness of the environment, could 
appear as an important contribution in retrospect. Anyway it doesn't quote the anthropic principle). 
The resurgence in teleological views in connection with the anthropic principle(s) reached a peak with the publication of the 
Barrow-Tipler essay (which is opened by a preface by Wheeler). The two authors advocated indeed an eutaxiological 
perspective (i.e.: aimed to point at the presence of a mathematical order and a „co-present, harmonius composition” of things 
in nature) rather than a teleological one. They outlined however a line of continuity between contemporary cosmology and a 
long series of philosophical speculations on the Design argument, and were surely responsible for large part of the common 
matching between anthropic reasoning and teleology. 
To evaluate the impact of the teleological insights of Barrow-Tipler's essay, one may consult the following critical reviews: 
Press, W.H.: A place for teleology?, Nature 320, 1986, p. 315-316; Silk, J.: Teleological cosmology, Science 232, 1986, p. 
1036; Gale, G: A revised Design: teleology and big questions in contemporary physics, Biology and Philosophy 2, 1987, p. 
475-491; Craig, W.L.: Barrow and Tipler on the anthropic principle vs. Divine Design, British Journal for the Philosophy of  
Science 38, 1988; p. 389-395. 
165
 Tennant, F.R.: Philosophical theology, two volumes, Cambridge 1928-1930. Cf. Barrow, J.D.-Tipler, F.J.: The anthropic 
cosmological …, section 3.9 and Craig, W.L.: The teleological argument and the anthropic principle, in: The logic of 
rational theism: exploratory essays, Craig, W.L.-McLeod, M. (eds.), Lewiston, N.Y. 1990, p. 127-153. 
166
 Literature is full of papers on these topics, including some contributions of mine: Bettini, S.: Il labirinto antropico, … 
(quoted on n. 2 above);  The many faces of the anthropic principle, forthcoming in Memorie della Società Astronomica 
Italiana. 
167
 Carter, B.: The anthropic principle: self-selection as …; The anthropic selection principle and the ultra-Darwinian 
synthesis, in: The anthropic principle, Proceedings of the second Venice conference on cosmology and philosophy November 
1988, Bertola, U.- Curi, V. (eds.), Cambridge 1993, p. 33-66. Amongst the wide literature on the epistemological status of 
the anthropic principle see for instance: Earman, J.: The SAP also rises: a critical examination of the anthropic principle, 
American Philosophical Quarterly 24, 1987, p. 307-317; Kanitscheider, B.: The anthropic principle and its epistemological 
status in modern physical cosmology, in: Philosophy and the origin and evolution of the universe, Agazzi, E.-Cordero, A. 
(eds.), Dordrecht 1991, p. 361-397; Bergia, S.: What, if anything, is the anthropic cosmological principle telling us?, in: 
Frontiers of fundamental physics, Barone, M.-Selleri, F. (eds.), New York, 1994, p. 73-82; Kirschenmann, P.P. 1994: 
Tautologie, methodologische Waarschuwing of Noodverklaring? een Kritische bespreking van enkele Antropische 
Principes, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 56, p. 463-493, Rebaglia, A.: Critica della ragione metascientifica. Argomenti antropici 
e spiegazioni scientifiche, Milano 1996. 
168
 This passage is taken by the draft of an article on the anthropic principle sent by Carter to Richard Matzner. 
169
 While in the early 1980ies there were no compelling reasons to invoke seriously the concept of many universes in the 
form of disconnected domains, in the successive years that same concept was seen under a new light after a big change due 
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describing a multitude of causally disconnected branches of space/time called bubbles, domains or 
simply universes became customary in inflationary and quantum cosmology. 
In recent times, moreover, while Carter has changed his mind with respect to both SAP and the many-
worlds philosophy170, a plethora of anthropic principles have been invoked in technical contexts and 
philosophical debates. 
It seems that, although we surely have today a deeper understanding of various  unsolved problems of 
the standard theory in comparison with the 1970ies, the advancement of knowledge has not made the 
need for anthropic reasoning obsolete. The emergence of many contemporary cosmological scenarios 
seems instead to have simply shifted anthropic explanations at a more profound theoretical level. 
In conclusion I am then ready to affirm as a matter of fact that, although physicists have surely gone 
deeper in a series of issues since 1973, this does not seem to have eliminated at all the appeal to the 
anthropic reasoning.171 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
to the failure of early inflationary models, to new developments in fundamental physics and to the emergence (or 
persistence) of problems like those represented by the current value of the cosmological constant, the level of isotropy of the 
cosmic microwave background and the origin of cosmic structures. The cosmologists of the 1990ies moreover accepted the 
presence of a "random element in the initial evolutionary history of the universe" (Barrow, J.D.: Unprincipled cosmology, 
Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society 34, 1993, p. 117-134, on p. 131) as a consequence of developments in 
fundamental physics. 
During the 1980ies and the 1990ies, theories as Linde proposals (chaotic or eternal inflation) invoked then disconnected 
domains in the universe as a consequence of spontaneous symmetry breaking in very early phases and depicted at last the 
concept itself of a primeval explosion as a local event and our universe as a particular space/time domain of a globally 
stationary multiverse. All this contributed to make many universes scenarios a common occurrence. 
170
 Cf. Carter, B.: The anthropic selection principle …, p. 36. At the Venice conference of 1988 Carter confessed to find 
antiquated his old perspective on both SAP and the many worlds philosophy. He affirmed this explicitly in the (unpublished) 
discussion that followed Sciama’s talk (which was indeed dedicated to the many universes). Anyway, Carter’s new attitude 
emerged in Venice also from his own talk and from the discussion of Ellis, G.F.R.: The anthropic principle: laws and 
environments (in: Bertola, U.-Curi, V. (eds.): The Anthropic principle, …, p. 27-36). He said: „it should be borne in mind 
that if the fine structure constant had been different one may guess that nature would have found alternative but not 
necessarily less effective mechanisms for doing the same jobs, so the argument for the strong anthropic principle (better 
described as the strong anthropic proposal) is not as strong as might at first appear”. 
171
 Among all the recent applications of the anthropic reasoning, I want to remember here just one example: Tegmark and 
Rees attempt to justify anthropically the value of the adimensional number Q ≡ ∆T/T, which express the observed density 
fluctuations of the microwave background. See: Tegmark, M.-Rees, M.J.: Why is the cosmic microwave background 
fluctuation level 10-5?, Astrophysical Journal 499, 1998, p. 526-532.
 
